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Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coali-
tional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a
continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-
empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countably additive mea-
sures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and
the least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and
the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably additive
payo measures in the prekernel.
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1 Introduction
Solution concepts for coalitional games with an infinite set of players have
been studied in many works. Most of these works deal with the core and the
Shapley value. Bargaining sets and related solution concepts for games with
a finite set of players have been studied intensively (for a comprehensive
survey see Maschler [11]). There are a few works concerning bargaining sets
(and related concepts) of games with an infinite set of players. Wesley [21]
deals with the kernel of games with a countable set of players. Bird [3] studies
the nucleolus-like solutions for games with a measurable space of players.
Mas-Colell [14] introduces his bargaining set in the context of pure exchange
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economies with a continuum of agents. Shitovitz [19] deals with the Mas-
Colell bargaining set in mixed market games. Einy et al. [8] study the
Mas-Colell bargaining set in convex games with a measurable space of
players.
The present work deals with the least core, the kernel, and the Aumann-
Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets for superadditive games with a
countable set of players. The least core was introduced by Maschler, Peleg
and Shapley [13], where they study its relation to the kernel and the nucle-
olus. It is well known that the core of a continuous game with a measurable
space of players, if it is non-empty, consists of countably additive payo
measures (e.g., Schmeidler [17]). Here we show that the least core of a
continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-
empty norm-compact subset of the set of all countably additive measures
defined on the set of coalitions (see Theorem A).
The kernel of a cooperative game was introduced by Davis and Maschler
[5]. Since then it has been the subject of many studies. Originally it was
regarded as an auxiliary solution concept whose main task was to illuminate
the properties of the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set. Nevertheless, the
kernel possesses interesting mathematical properties, and reflects in many
ways the structure of the game. The prekernel is a simplified version of the
kernel which is not restricted to individually rational payos. We show that
in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players the pre-
kernel (and hence the kernel) and the least core have a non-empty intersec-
tion. The proof of this result uses finite approximations. Wesley [21] proved
by using non-standard analysis that under some conditions the kernel of a
superadditive game with a countable set of players is non-empty (for every
coalition structure). We show that Wesley’s conditions imply that the game is
continuous. We also give an example of a continuous game which does not
satisfy one of Wesley’s conditions (see Lemma 4.3 and Example 4.4). Thus,
Wesley’s result is a special case of our result when the coalition structure
includes only the grand coalition.
The first definition of a bargaining set for cooperative games was given in
Aumann and Maschler [1]. Recently, several new concepts of bargaining set
have been introduced (see Maschler [11] for a survey). Davis and Maschler
[4] and Peleg [15] proved that the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set is non-
empty in a coalitional game with a finite set of players. We show that in
continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players, the Aum-
ann-Maschler bargaining set contains the set of all countably additive payo
measures in the prekernel, and thus it always contains a countably additive
payo measure (see Theorem C).
Mas-Colell [14] proposed a bargaining set which is a modification of the
Aumann-Maschler bargaining set. One of the advantage of the Mas-Colell
bargaining set is that it can be defined for games with a continuum of players.
Mas-Colell [14] showed that in atomless pure exchange economies his bar-
gaining set coincides with the set of competitive equilibria, and he pointed
out that in finite coalitional games, the prekernel is always contained in his
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bargaining set (see also Vohra [20]). In the definition of the Mas-Colell
bargaining set it is not assumed that payos are individually rational. We
show that in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players
the Mas-Colell bargaining set contains the set of all countably additive
payo measures in the prekernel, and thus it always contains an individually
rational countably additive payo measure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic definitions
and the preliminary results which are relevant to our work. In Section 3 we
prove that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a count-
able set of players is a non-empty norm-compact subset of the space of all
countably additive measures on the set of coalitions. In Section 4 we show
that in continuous superadditive games with a countable set of players the
least core and the prekernel have a non-empty intersection. In Section 5 we
prove that in continuous superadditive games the bargaining set of Aumann
and Maschler and that of Mas-Colell contain the set of all countably additive
payo measures in the prekernel.
2 Basic definitions and preliminary results
In this section we define some basic notions we use throughout and prove
some preliminary results.
2.1 Mathematical preliminaries
Let N be the set of natural numbers. The set of subsets of N is denoted by 2N .
The set of all functions f : N ! f0; 1g is denoted by f0; 1gN . Note that
f0; 1gN is a compact metric space (as the product of countable metric spaces),
and convergence of sequences in this metric is identical to pointwise con-
vergence. Every S 2 2N can be naturally identified with its indicator function
1S 2 f0; 1gN . The correspondence S !1S induces a metric on 2N under
which it is compact. It is well known that a sequence fSng1n 1 converges to S
(written limn!1 Sn  S) in this metric if and only if
S  limn!1Sn  limn!1Sn;
where limn!1Sn 
S1
n 1
T1
k n Sk; and limn!1Sn 
T1
n 1
S1
k n Sk.
If fSng1n 1 is a sequence of sets in 2N such that Sn  Sn1; and
S1
n 1 Sn  S
we write Sn % S. Similarly, if fSng1n 1 is a sequence of sets in 2N such that
Sn1  Sn; and
T1
n 1 Sn  S; then we write Sn & S. Note that if fSng1n 1 is a
sequence such that Sn % S or Sn & S; then limn!1 Sn  S. A function
v : 2N ! < is monotonic if vS  vT  whenever S  T . A function v on 2N is
continuous if it is continuous with respect to the natural topology on 2N
defined above. For monotonic functions we have the following character-
ization of continuity.
Lemma 2.1. Let v : 2N ! < be a monotonic function. Then v is continuous if
and only if for every S 2 2N we have limn!1 vSn  vS whenever Sn % S or
Sn & S.
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Proof. We prove the non-obvious part of the lemma. Let S 2 2N . Assume
limn!1 vSn  vS whenever Sn % S or Sn & S. We show that v is contin-
uous at S. Let fSng1n 1 be such that limn!1 Sn  S; that is S  limn!1Sn 
limn!1Sn. We show that limn!1 vSn  vS. For each n let An 
T1
k n Sk;
and Bn 
S1
k n Sk. As v is monotonic and An  Sn  Bn for each n; then vAn
 vSn  vBn for each n. Now, An1  An and S  limSn 
S1
n 1 An. Also
Bn1  Bn; and S  limSn 
T1
n 1 Bn. Thus, An % S and Bn & S. Hence by
our assumption
lim
n!1 vAn  limn!1 vBn  vS;
and therefore limn!1 vSn  vS: u
We now recall some standard definitions and results from measure theory
which are used throughout the paper. A finitely additive measure on 2N is a
function l : 2N ! < which satisfies lA [ B  lA  lB whenever A and
B are two disjoint subsets of N . The measure l is called countably additive if
for every countable family fAig1i 1 of disjoint subsets of N we have
lS1i 1 Ai P1i 1 lAi. It is well known that l is countably additive i it is
continuous at N . A finitely additive measure l on 2N is called purely finitely
additive if there is no non-negative and non-zero countably additive measure
k such that kA  lA for all A 2 2N . We note that if l is non-negative,
then it is purely finitely additive i it vanishes at every finite subset of N . A
theorem of Yosida and Hewitt (e.g., Theorem 1.23 of Yosida and Hewitt
[22]) asserts that any finitely additive measure can be uniquely decomposed
into a sum of a countably additive measure and a purely finitely additive
measure.
The Banach space of all bounded finitely additive measures on 2N with
the variation norm is denoted by ba. Its closed subspace consisting of all
countable additive measures is denoted by ca. It is well known that ba is
naturally identified with the dual space of l1  l1N; which is the Banach
space of all bounded sequences of real numbers. Also, ca can be naturally
identified with l1  l1N; i.e., every x 2 l1 corresponds to lx 2 ca, where
lxS 
X
i2S
xi ;
for every S 2 2N .
The following lemma plays an important role in our work.
Lemma 2.2. Let K be a weak-compact subset of ba that contains only
countably additive measures (i.e., K  ca). Then K is norm-compact.
Proof. Since K  ca; we can view K as a subset of ‘1. As ba is the norm-dual
of ‘1; which in turns is the norm-dual of ‘1; the weak topology induced by
ba on K coincides with the weak topology induced by ‘1 on K. Hence K is a
weakly compact subset of ‘1. Since ‘1 is a separable Banach space, the weak
topology on its weakly compact subsets is metrizable (see e.g., Theorem
3.V.6.3 in Dunford-Schwartz [7]). Therefore K is weakly sequentially
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compact in ‘1. By Schur’s Theorem (see Diestel [6], page 85, and Corollary 14
page 296 of Dunford-Schwartz [7]), weak convergence and norm conver-
gence of sequences are equivalent in ‘1; hence K is norm-compact in ‘1: u
We conclude this subsection with some definitions concerning nets which
will be used in the proof of Theorem B.
A directed system is a pair D;; where D is a set and  is a binary
relation on D such that the following holds:
(a) If a  b and b  c; then a  c.
(b) If a; b 2 D; then there exists c 2 D such that a  c and b  c.
A net is a mapping of a directed system into a topological space X . We
usually write xa for the value of the net at a 2 D and fxa j a 2 Dg (or simply
fxag) for the net itself. We say that fxag converges to a point x 2 X if for
every open set O containing x there exists a0 2 D such that xa 2 O for all
a  a0. Let fxa j a 2 Dg be a net. For every a 2 D let ba 2 D be such that
ba  a; then the set fxba j a 2 Dg is called a subnet of fxa j a 2 Dg.
For a further discussion of nets and related notions the reader is referred
to Kelley [10], p. 65 72.
2.2 Game theoretic preliminaries
We refer to the members of N as players, and to each subset of N as a coalition.
A game is a bounded function v : 2N ! < satisfying v;  0; and for which
there is k 2 ca such that vS  kS for every S 2 2N . (Note that the later
requirement is satisfied for every non-negative set function v with k  0: A
game v is superadditive if vS [ T   vS  vT  for every two disjoint co-
alitions S; T 2 2N . Throughout this paper we assume that all games under
consideration are superadditive, but to avoid confusion we emphasize it in the
statements of the results. Note that every k 2 ca is continuous, and that if
vS  kS for all S; then vÿk is a monotonic function. Hence by Lemma 2.1
a game v is continuous on 2N if and only if limn!1 vSn  vS whenever
Sn % S or Sn & S. Note that our definition of continuity coincides with that of
Schmeidler [17] (see also Aumann and Shapley [2]).
For every game v and every coalition S 2 2N ; we define
rvS  inf
Xn
i 1
vSi;
where infimum is taken over all finite partitions fS1; S2; . . . ; Sng of S. Note
that rvi  vfig for every i 2 N . Note also that rv 2 ba. Moreover, rv is
the largest measure in ba such that rvS  vS for all S 2 2N ; that is, if
k 2 ba and kS  vS for all S 2 2N ; then k  rv (pointwise). Also, if v is
continuous then rv 2 ca.
A payo measure (or a preimputation) is a measure k 2 ba such that
kN  vN. A payo measure k is individually rational if k  rv. An im-
putation is an individually rational payo measure. The set of all imputations
is denoted by Iv.
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3 The least core
Recall that the core of a game v, denoted by Cv; is the set o all imputa-
tions l 2 Iv such that lS  vS for each S 2 2N . For every k 2 ba let
f k  supfvS ÿ kS j S  Ng. The least core of the game v; denoted
LCv; is the set of all imputations l 2 Iv for which f attains its minimal
value on Iv. Note that since f is the supremum of ane weak-continuous
functions, it is a convex and lower semicontinuous function on ba. As Iv is
a weak-compact subset of ba; f attains its minimal value v on Iv.
Therefore LCv is a non-empty convex weak-compact subset of Iv. We
note that v  0; and v  0 if and only if Cv 6 ;. In this case Cv  LCv.
Theorem A. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then LCv is a non-
empty convex norm-compact subset of ca.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 it suces to prove that LCv  ca. Without loss of
generality (w.l.o.g.) assume that rv is identically zero. (Alternatively, we
could replace the game v with the game w  vÿ rv, which is also continuous
and satisfies l 2 LCw if and only if l rv 2 LCv: Also w.l.o.g. assume
that vN  1. Finally, we may assume that v > 0; as otherwise the result
follows from Schmeidler [17].
Let l 2 LCv. By Theorem 1.23 of Yosida and Hewitt [22], l can be
uniquely decomposed into a sum of a non-negative countably additive
measure lc and a non-negative purely finitely additive measure lp (i.e., a
measure lp satisfying lpS  0; for each finite S 2 R. We must show that lp
is identically zero. As lp is non-negative, it suces to show that lpN  0.
Assume that lpN > 0. We show that this implies that maxfvS ÿ lcS
j S 2 2Ng > v. This leads to a contradiction since maxfvS ÿ lcS
j S 2 2Ng (which exists because vÿ lc is continuous) is bounded above by v.
Indeed, let S 2 2N ; and for every n 2 N define Sn  f1; . . . ; ng. Then
vS ÿ lcS  limn!1vS \ Sn ÿ lcS \ Sn
 lim
n!1vS \ Sn ÿ lS \ Sn
 v:
In the remaining of the proof of Theorem A assume that lpN > 0. The
proof proceeds in several steps.
STEP 1: We show that lcN > 0.
Assume by way of contradiction that lcN  0. Then l  lp. As
l 2 LCv; vS ÿ lS  v; for every S 2 2N . As v is continuous, we have
limn!1 vSn  vN  1. Since l  lp and lpSn  0; we have vSn ÿ lSn
 vSn; for each n: Therefore v  vSn for each n; and thus v  1. Let
n 2 Iv be given for each S 2 2N by nS Pi2S 2ÿi. As vÿ n is continuous,
there is S 2 2N such that vS ÿ nS  maxfvS ÿ nS j S 2 2Ng. From
the definition of v it is clear that 1  v  vS ÿ nS; hence S 6 ;. Also
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vS  1; and nS > 0 for each S 6 ; in 2N . Summing up these inequalities
we have
1  v  vS ÿ nS  1ÿ nS < 1 ;
which is a contradiction. Hence lcN > 0.
STEP 2: We show that the payo measure k  1lcNlc is a member of LCv.
Let a  1lcN. As lpN > 0; a > 1. For each S 2 2
N we have
vS ÿ kS  vS ÿ alcS  vS ÿ lcS ÿ aÿ 1lcS  vS ÿ lcS:
Recall that Sn  f1; . . . ; ng. Then for all S 2 2N we have
vS ÿ kS  lim
n!1vS \ Sn ÿ kS \ Sn
 lim
n!1vS \ Sn ÿ lcS \ Sn
 lim
n!1vS \ Sn ÿ lS \ Sn
 v:
Therefore k 2 LCv.
STEP 3: We show that maxfvS ÿ lcS j S 2 2Ng > v; and we will get the
desired contradiction.
For every S 2 2N we have vS ÿ lcS  vS ÿ lS. As l 2 LCv; we
have supfvS ÿ lS j S 2 2Ng  v. Hence maxfvSÿ lcS j S 2 2Ng  v.
We show that this inequality is strict. Assume to the contrary that
maxfvS ÿ lcS j S 2 2Ng  v. Let k  1lcN lc; by Step 2, k 2 LCv. Now
if S 2 2N is such that vS ÿ kS  v; then kS  0. For otherwise we
would have vS ÿ lcS > vS ÿ kS  v. Let S0  fi 2 N j kfig  0g.
Because k 2 ca; kS0  0. Let S 2 2N be such that vS ÿ kS  v (S 6 ;
because v > 0); hence kS  0; and therefore S  S0. Thus, S0 6 ;.
Let j 2 NnS0. Then kfjg > 0. Let Cj  fS 2 2N j j 2 Sg. The set
f1S j S 2 Cjg is a closed subset of f0; 1gN in the topology of pointwise
convergence, and therefore it is compact. Let Q 2 Cj be such that vQ
ÿkQ  maxfvS ÿ kS j S 2 Cjg. Let d  vQ ÿ kQ. If d  v; then
kQ  0; which is impossible since j 2 Q; and therefore kQ  kfjg > 0.
Hence d < v. Let 0 <  < minkfjg; v ÿ d; and for each i 2 S0 let
i  2 iP
l2S0
2 l
. Also for each i 2 N define
k^fig 
i i 2 S0
kfjg ÿ  i  j
kfig i =2 S0 [ fjg
8<: 
Note that k^ 2 ca. Moreover, since k^S0  , we have k^N  1; and
therefore k^ 2 Iv. We show that maxfvS ÿ k^S j S 2 2Ng < v; and this
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will contradict the definition of v. Let S 2 2N , S 6 ;. We distinguish two
cases.
(a) S  S0. In this case we have vS ÿ k^S < vS ÿ kS  v.
(b) S  S1 [ S2; where S1  S0; and S2  NnS0 satisfies S2 6 ;. Since
S2 6 ;; we have kS > 0; hence vS ÿ kS < v. If j =2 S; then vS ÿ k^S
 vS ÿ kS < v. If j 2 S; then vS ÿ kS  d. Thus
vS ÿ k^S  vS ÿ kS  kS ÿ k^S
 d kS ÿ k^S
 kS1 ÿ k^S1  d kfjg ÿ k^fjg
 d  < v: (
The following example taken from Kannai [9] (Example 2.1) shows that
when a game is not continuous its least core may contain only purely finitely
additive payo measures.
Example 3.4. Define a game v by
vS  1 NnS is finite
0 otherwise.

It is easy to see that the core of v is not empty, and therefore it coincides with
the least core. Since a payo measure l 2 ba is in the core of v if and only if
lS  0 for each finite S 2 2N ; the least core of v contains only purely finitely
additive measures.
Remark. The least core for games with a finite set of players was defined by
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [13] as the set of all payo measures l for which
min
k2Iv
max
S 6 ;;S 6 N
vS ÿ kS
is attained at k  l; where Iv is the set of preimputations. It can be easily
verified that for games with an empty core our definition applied to a game
with a finite set of players coincides with the above definition. However, if
Cv 6 ; then LCv  Cv according to our definition, whereas the original
definition may yield a strict subset of the core. In this work we restrict
ourselves to solution concepts which are individually rational. Therefore we
use our definition which also turn out to be more convenient from the
technical point of view.
4 The kernel
The set of all payo measures in a game v is denoted by Iv; that is
Iv  fl 2 ba j lN  vNg:
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For i; j 2 N ; i 6 j; define the set
Tij  fS 2 2N j i 2 S; j =2 Sg:
Also for i; j 2 N ; i 6 j; and l 2 ba define
sijl  supfvS ÿ lS j S 2Tijg:
The prekernel of v is the set
PKv  fl 2 Iv j sijl  sjil; 8i; j 2 N ; i 6 jg:
The kernel of v is the set
Kv  fl 2 Iv j sijl ÿ sjillfjg ÿ rvfjg  0; 8i; j 2 N ; i 6 jg:
The notion of the kernel of a coalitional game with a finite set of players was
introduced by Davis and Maschler [5]. It is well-known that if v is a super-
additive game with a finite set of players, then Kv  PKv (see Theorem
2.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [12]). It is also well-known that for such
games Kv \ LCv 6 ;. In fact, the nucleolus of v is contained in this in-
tersection (see Corollary 6.7 in Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [13], and The-
orem 3 in Schmeidler [16]). Theorem B below establishes that the prekernel
(and hence the kernel) and the least core have a non-empty intersection for
continuous games.
Theorem B. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then PKv\
LCv 6 ;. In particular, PKv contains an individually rational countably
additive payo measure.
We need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then each function
sij; i; j 2 N ; ; i 6 j; is norm-continuous on ca.
Proof. Let l 2 ca and let flng1n 1  ca be such that limn!1 kln ÿ lk  0.
We show that for each i; j 2 N ; i 6 j; limn!1 sijln  sijl. Note that the
set f1S j S 2Tijg is a closed (and therefore a compact) subset of f0; 1gN in
the topology of pointwise convergence. Since v is continuous and each
ln 2 ca; vÿ ln attains its maximum on Tij. For each n 2 N let Sn 2Tij be
such that sijln  vSn ÿ lnSn; and similarly let S 2Tij satisfying sijl 
vS ÿ lS. Since vS ÿ lS  vSn ÿ lSn for every n 2 N ; we have
vSn ÿ lnSn  vSn ÿ lnSn  vS ÿ lS ÿ vSn ÿ lSn
 vS ÿ lS  lSn ÿ lnSn
 vS ÿ lS  klÿ lnk:
Also we have vSn ÿ lnSn  vS ÿ lnS for each n 2 N .
As klÿ lnk ! 0; limn!1vSn ÿ lnSn  vS ÿ lS. Hence,
lim
n!1 sijln  limn!1vSn ÿ lnSn  vS ÿ lS  sijl: (
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Lemma 4.2. Let w be a superadditive game with a finite support (i.e., for some
n  1;wS \ f1; . . . ; ng  wS; for all S 2 2N ). Then PKw \ LCw 6 ;.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that w  0. Let R  fS 2 2N j S  f1; . . . ; ngg; and
let u be the restriction of w to R. Since w is superadditive , u is a superadditive
game with a finite set of players. Therefore by Theorem 2.7 in Maschler,
Peleg and Shapley [12], we have PKu  Ku; and by Corollary 6.7 in
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [12], we have PKu \ LCu 6 ;.
Let l 2 PKu \ LCu. Define
lfig  lfig; 1  i  n
0; otherwise.

Obviously l 2 ca; and therefore there is S 2 2N such that
wS ÿ lS  maxfwS ÿ lS j S 2 2Ng:
Now,
w  wS ÿ lS
 uS \ f1; . . . ; ng ÿ lS \ f1; . . . ; ng
 u:
Let k 2 LCw; since k minimizes the function f n  supfwS ÿ nS
j S 2 2Ng on Iw; we have kS  0 for each S  Nnf1; . . . ; ng. Thus
w  maxfwS ÿ kS j S 2 2Ng
 maxfuQ ÿ kQ j Q 2 Rg
 u:
Hence wS ÿ lS  w; and therefore l 2 LCw.
Now,
maxfwS ÿ lS j S 2Tijg  maxfuQ ÿ lQ j Q 2 R \Tijg; 4:1
and
maxfwS ÿ lS j S 2Tjig  maxfuQ ÿ lQ j Q 2 R \Tjig: 4:2
As l 2 PKu \ LCu; we get from 4:1 and 4:2 that l 2 PKw\
LCw: u
With these results at hand we can now complete the proof of Theorem B.
Proof of Theorem B. Assume, w.l.o.g., that rv is identically zero and
vN  1. For every n 2 N let Sn  f1; . . . ; ng; and let vn be the game given by
vnS  vS \ Sn. By Lemma 4.2, for each n 2 N there is ln 2 PKvn
\LCvn. As the games vn are continuous, then by Theorem A, ln 2 ca for
each n. Let M be the weak-closure in ba of the set M  fln j n 2 Ng. We
show that M is a norm-compact subset of ca. This yields that the sequence
flng1n 1 has a subsequence which converges in the norm to a member of
PKv \ LCv. As M is a weak-compact subset of ba; then by Lemma 2.2 it
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suces to show that M  ca. Moreover, since M  ca; it suces to show that
each l 2 MnM is a member of ca. Let l 2 MnM . Then there exists a net
flna j a 2 Dg in M which converges to l. Let k 2 LCv. By Theorem A,
k 2 ca. We distinguish two cases (note that k  0 and kN  1).
(1) At least one the following holds:
1a The net fkSna j a 2 Dg does not converge to 1.
1b The net fvSnag does not converge to 1.
1c There exists a coalition S such that the net fvnaSg does not
converge to vS.
We show that if 1a is satisfied then l is countably additive (the proof that l
is countably additive when 1b or 1c are satisfied is similar). Now 1a
implies that there exists a subnet of fkSna j a 2 Dg that converges to a
number a 2 [0,1). Assume, w.l.o.g., that fkSna j a 2 Dg itself converges to
a. Let  > 0 be such that a  < 1; then there is a0 2 D such that for each
a  a0 (here  denotes the order relation on D) we have kSna < a  < 1.
As limn!1 kSn  1; there is n0 2 N such that kSn > a  for every n > n0.
Thus, for each a  a0 we have na  n0: Let S 2 2N . As flnag converges in
the weak-topology to l; the net flnaSg converges to lS. Hence there is
b0 2 D such that for each b  b0 we have jlnbS ÿ lSj < . From the
definition of a net it follows that there is c 2 D; such that c  a0; and c  b0.
Therefore nc  n0; and jlncS ÿ lSj < . Thus we have shown that if
0 <  < 1ÿ a is given, then for each S 2 2N there is 1  n  n0 such that
jlnS ÿ lSj < . Since the set f1; . . . ; n0g is finite and  can be chosen
arbitrarily small, there is 1  n  n0 such that lnS  lS.
We now show that this implies that l 2 ca. Assume that fTlg1l 1  2N is a
non-decreasing sequence of coalitions such that
S1
l 1 Tl  N . Then for every
l 2 N there is 1  n  n0 such that lnTl  lTl. Therefore there is a sub-
sequence flkg1k 1  N ; and 1  n  n0; such that lTlk   lnTlk  for each
k 2 N :As ln 2 Ivn \ ca; limk!1 lnTlk   1. Therefore limk!1 lTlk   1.
Now flTlg1l 1 is a non-decreasing and bounded sequence of real numbers,
and therefore it converges. As flTlk g1k 1 is a subsequence of flTlg1l 1
which converges to 1, we have liml!1 lTl  1. Thus, l 2 ca.
(2) Case (1) does not hold. We show that in this case l 2 LCv and thus by
Theorem A it is countably additive. As k 2 LCv; then for each a 2 D and all
S  N we have
vS \ Sna ÿ kS \ Sna  v:
Since kSna converges to 1, we assume, w.l.o.g., that kSna > 0 for each
a 2 D. For any S  N and a 2 D let
knaS 
vSna
kSna kS \ Sna;
and
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ana  1
vSna
kSna :
Then kna 2 Ivna; and the net fanag converges to zero. Also for every
S  N we have
vnaS knaS  vS \ Sna kS \ Sna  ana:
Therefore
vna  v  ana:
As lna 2 LCvna; for every S  N we have
vnaS lnaS  v  ana:
Hence for every S  N we have
vS lS  v:
Thus l 2 LCv. As v is continuous by Theorem A, LCv  ca. Therefore
l 2 ca.
We have shown that in any case l 2 ca. Thus, M  ca, and therefore it is
norm compact in ca. As the sequence fln j n 2 Ng  M ; there is a subse
quence flnkg1k 1 which converges in the norm to a member l of ca. As
limk!1 lSnk   limk!1 vSnk   1; and limk!1 vnk S   v S  for each
S 2 2N ; an argument identical to the one given in (2) above yields l 2 LCv.
Let i; j 2 N ; i 6 j. Since lnk 2 PKvnk  for each k 2 N ; we have sijlnk   sjilnk . By Lemma 4.1, limk!1 sij lnk
ÿ   sij l ; and limk!1 sjilnk   sjil.
Therefore sijl  sjil; and thus l 2 PKv. Hence, PKv \ LCv 6 ;: (
Wesley [21] showed by using non standard analysis that a non negative
game v has a non empty kernel (for every coalition structure) if it satisfied the
following conditions:
For each S 2 2N ; lim
n!1vS vS \ f1; . . . ng  0; and4:3 X1
i 1
ri <1;where ri  supfvS [ fig vS j S  Nnfigg :4:4
We show that 4:3 and 4:4 imply that v is continuous; and then we give
an example of a continuous game which does not satisfy 4:4. Thus,
Wesley’s Theorem is a special case of Theorem B when the coalition
structure is fNg.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that v is a non negative superadditive game which satisfies
4:3 and 4:4. Then v is continuous.
Proof. Let S 2 2N . We first show that if fSng1n 1 is a non decreasing sequence
of coalitions such that
S1
n 1 Sn  S; then limn!1 vSn  vS. Indeed, if
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fSng1n 1 is such a sequence then for each n 2 N there is mn such that
m  m n  implies S \ f1; . . . ; ng  Sm. As v is monotonic we have
vS \ f1; . . . ; ng  vSm  vS;
for every m  mn. Thus by 4:3, limn!1 vSn  vS.
Assume now that fSng1n 1 is a non-increasing sequence of coalitions such
that
T1
n 1 Sn  S. We show that limn!1 vSn  vS. For A  N we define
rA Pi2A ri. Then r 2 ca. Let n 2 N ; and let B 2 2N be such that
B \ S  ;. We show that vS [ B ÿ vB  rB. Define Bn  B \ f1; . . . ; ng.
Then by (4.4)
vS [ Bn ÿ vS  rBn:
As Bn1  Bn; and
S1
n 1 Bn  B; by what we have just shown,
limn!1 vS [ Bn  vS [ B. Since limn!1 rBn  rB), we have
vS [ B ÿ vS  rB:
As B was an arbitrary coalition, for each n 2 N we have
0  vSn ÿ vS  vS [ SnnS ÿ vS  rSnnS:
As limn!1 rSnnS  0; we have limn!1 vSn  vS: u
We give an example of a non-negative continuous game which does not
satisfy (4.4).
Example 4.4. For every 0  x  1 let f x  1ÿ 1ÿ xp . Define a measure
l 2 ca by lS  cPi2S 1i2 ; where c  P1i 1 1i2 1. For every S  N let
vS  f lS. Since f is continuous on [0,1], v is continuous. Moreover, as
f is convex on [0,1], v is convex; that is,
vS1 [ S2  vS1 \ S2  vS1  vS2
for each S1; S2  N (see Shapley [18]), and in particular, v is superadditive.
For every i 2 N we have
ri  supfvS [ fig ÿ vS j S  Nnfigg  vN ÿ vNnfig:
As
vN ÿ vNnfig  c
p
i
;
we have X1
i 1
ri  c
p X1
i 1
1
i
:
Thus
P1
i 1 ri  1; and (4.4) is not satisfied.
As it was mentioned above, Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [13] showed
that for superadditive games with a finite set of players the kernel coincides
with the prekernel. By Theorems B there are always countably additive
payos measures in the kernel and the prekernel of a continuous superad-
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ditive game on 2N . Using the compactness of 2N the same proofs as those of
Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.7 in Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [13] yield.
Proposition 4.5. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then every count-
ably additive payo measure in PKv is individually rational.
Proposition 4.6. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then
Kv \ ca  PKv \ ca:
5 Bargaining sets
In this section we establish that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell
bargaining sets of a continuous game with a countable set of players are non-
empty sets which contain the set of all countably additive payo measures in
the prekernel.
Let v be a game, let l 2 Iv, and let i; j 2 N ; i 6 j; be two players. An
objection of i to j in l is a pair A; k such that k 2 ba; k  rv;A  N ;
i 2 A; j =2A; kA  vA; and kfkg > lfkg for each k 2 A. A counterob-
jection of j to A; k is a pair B; n such that n 2 ba; n  rv;B  N ; j 2 B;
i =2B; nB  vB; nfkg  lfkg for k 2 BnA; and nfkg  kfkg for
k 2 A \ B. A justified objection of i 2 N to j in l is an objection which does
not have a counterobjection. The Aumann-Maschler bargaining set (see
Aumann and Maschler [1]) of v is the set Bv of all imputations l 2 Iv such
that no player i has a justified objection to another player in l.
Davis and Maschler [4], and Peleg [15] showed that if v is a game with a
finite set of players, then Bv is a non-empty set. For this class of games,
Davis and Maschler [5] proved that Kv is a subset of Bv. Theorem C
below establishes that if v is a continuous game, then the set of all countably
additive payo measures in the prekernel is contained Bv.
Theorem C. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then PKv \ ca
 Bv. In particular, Bv contains a countably additive payo measure.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that rv is identically zero. Let l 2 PKv \ ca. We
show that l 2 Bv. Assume to the contrary that l =2Bv. Then there are
i; j 2 N ; i 6 j; such that j has a justified objection A; k to i in l. By the
Yosida and Hewitt Theorem [22], k can be uniquely decomposed into a sum
of a non-negative countably additive measure kc; and a non-negative purely
finitely additive measure kp (note that k  rv; and thus k  0. As kp vanishes
on finite subsets of N ; we have kcfkg > lfkg for each k 2 A; and
kcA  kA  vA. Since any counterobjection to A; kc is also a
counterobjection to A; k; A; kc is a justified objection. Since v is continu-
ous and l 2 ca; there is B 2 2N such that i 2 B; j =2B; and
sijl  vB ÿ lB:
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As l 2 PK v ;
vB ÿ lB  sjil  vA ÿ lA:
Since kcfjg > lfjg;
vA ÿ lA 
X
k2A
kcfkg ÿ lfkg
>
X
k2A\B
kcfkg ÿ lfkg:
Therefore
vB ÿ
X
k2A
lfkg >
X
k2A\B
kcfkg ÿ lfkg;
i.e.,
vB >
X
k2A\B
kcfkg 
X
k2BnA
lfkg:
For each S  N let n S   kcS \ A  lS \ BnA. Then nB  vB by
the last inequality, and if k 2 A \ B; nfkg  kcfkg; and if l 2 BnA; then
nflg  lflg. Therefore each member of B (and in particular player i) has
a counterobjection to the objection A; kc of j, which contradicts the fact
that A; kc is a justified objection. Now by Theorem A, PKv \ LCv 
PKv \ ca. Therefore by Theorem B, Bv contains a countably additive
payo measure. u
Mas Colell [14] proposed a notion of bargaining set dierent from that of
Aumann and Maschler bargaining set, and showed that in the context of a
market with a continuum of players, this new bargaining set coincides with
the set of walrasian allocations. The advantage of the Mas-Colell bargaining
set is that it can be defined for games with an uncountable set of players.
The following definitions are taken from Einy et al. [8], who provide a
straightforward generalization of the Mas-Colell [14] definition to games
with an infinite set of players. Let v be a game, and let l be a payo measure
in v. An objection to l (in the sense of Mas-Colell) is a pair A; k such that
A 2 2N , and k 2 ba satisfies kA  vA, kA > lA, and kB  lB for
every coalition B  A. A counterobjection (in the sense of Mas-Colell) to the
objection A; k is a pair C; n such that
n 2 ba; andnC  vC;5:1
For every B  A \ C; nB  kB; and for every D  CnA;5:2
nD  lD; and
nC > kA \ C  lCnA:5:3
A justified objection is an objection which has no counterobjection. TheMas-
Colell bargaining set of v is the set MBv of all payo measures which have
no justified objection.
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Mas-Colell [14] in considering exchange economies with a continuum of
agents, defines the bargaining set without restricting attention to individually
rational allocations. Thus, his equivalence result holds for a large set. From
the point of view of an existence result it will be interesting to show that the
Mas-Colell bargaining set always contains an individually rational payo
measure. Theorem D below establishes that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of
a continuous game contains the set of all countably additive payo measures
in the prekernel. As a consequence, for these games the Mas-Colell bar-
gaining set contains an individually rational countably additive payo
measure.
Theorem D. Let v be a superadditive continuous game. Then PKv \ ca
 MBv. In particular, MBv contains an individually rational countably
additive payo measure.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Theorem D.
Lemma 5.1. Let v be game, and let l be a payo measure in v: If A; k is a
justified objection to l, then vB  kB \ A  lBnA for each B 2 R.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is B 2 R such that vB > kB \ A
lBnA. Then B 6 ;. Let   vB ÿ kB \ A  lBnA. Choose t 2 B;
and let dt be the probability measure concentrated on ftg. Define n 2 ba by
nS  kS \ B \ A  lS \ BnA  dtS:
Thus, if S 2 R satisfies S  A \ B we have nS  kS; and if S 2 R satisfies
S  BnA we have nS  lS. Also
nB  vB > kB \ A  lBnA:
Thus B; n is a counterobjection to A; k; which is a contradiction. u
Proof of Theorem D. W.l.o.g. assume that rv is identically zero. Let
l 2 PKv \ ca. We show that l 2 MBv. Assume by way of contradiction
that l =2MBv. Then there is a justified objection A; k to l. Since l is a
payo measure, A 6 N . Assume, w.l.o.g., that kA  vA. Since A; k is a
justified objection to l, by Lemma 5.1 for each B  A we have kB  vB.
For each S 2 2N let vAS  vS \ A; and kAS  kS \ A. Then kA is in the
core of the game vA. Since vA is continuous, kA 2 ca. As kA > lA, there is
j 2 A such that kAfjg > lfjg. Let i 2 NnA. As l 2 PKv; there is
C  N ; i 2 C; j =2C; such that vC ÿ lC  sijl  vA ÿ lA. Since
kAfjg > lfjg, an argument identical to the one given in the proof of
Theorem C yields
vC >
X
k2A\C
kAfkg 
X
k2CnA
lfkg
 kA \ C  lCnA:
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By Lemma 5.1 this contradicts the assumption that A; k is a justified ob-
jection to l. Now by Theorem A, PKv \ LCv  MBv, and thus by
Theorem B, MBv contains an individually rational countably additive
payo measure. u
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